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In 1867 Finland was faced with a serious crop failure. An insufficient amount of food 
was imported and when the winter came, there was not enough grain to feed the 
hungry. Traditionally this event in Finnish history has been explained as a crisis of 
outdated agriculture and an inescapable natural and economic catastrophe. When 
examining the political aspects of the crisis, it is noticeable that the failure to import 
a sufficient amount of food was based not only on a lack of resources, but also 
on inefficient transfer and use of information and, indeed, a lack of will to help the 
hungry.
In the 1860s the Grand Duchy of Finland was a part of the Russian Empire. 
Finland formed a separate financial state from the Russian Empire that had to 
take care of its own financial operations. The department for financial affairs of 
the Senate of Finland, and its head, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, were responsible 
for finances and poor relief in Finland. The harvest reports, letters and telegrams 
of governors as well as the reports of the rapidly-developing local press provided 
Snellman with the possibility of staying informed on the food stocks and crop 
forecasts. Snellman’s political views are visible in his public writings and letters to 
the governors. All of the above are used as central source material in this article.
The Finnish Famine of 1867–8 has been cited as the last peacetime famine in Europe.1 
Certainly, the crisis – that took the lives of over 100,000 Finns – is exceptional in both 
Finnish and European history. In Finland a peacetime demographic catastrophe of 
this scale had not taken place since the seventeenth century, although crop failures 
had occurred quite regularly.2 In Europe the previous corresponding demographic 
catastrophe in terms of percentage mortality occurred in Ireland in the 1840s. In 
1 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 9. The Finnish famine of the 1860s was the 
last peacetime famine in Europe, if not taking into account the Soviet bloc. See Weiss, 2000, 175; 
Devereux, 2000, 3.
2 Soikkanen, 1991, 38–39.
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1867 the crop failures extended over large areas of Sweden and the Russian Empire 
including the Baltic Provinces, but a large-scale mortality crisis was encountered 
only in the territory of Finland.3 Earlier research has shown conclusively that due 
to a lack of stocks in granaries and the poor harvest of 1867 there was a serious 
lack of food in Finland in the autumn of 1867.4 The only viable option to meet this 
deficit would have been grain imports from abroad. In 1862 and 1865 poor harvests 
had been balanced with increased imports of grain, but in 1867 the amount of food 
imports was smaller than in the previous years.5 Why was a sufficient amount of 
grain not imported to Finland in the autumn of 1867?
Research on the 1860s crisis has emphasized the poor economic situation 
of Finland and inadequate information on crop forecasts during the summer of 
1867 as an explanation for the insufficient grain imports.6 Economic life in 1860s 
Finland was in a crisis and the economic possibilities of the merchants to carry out 
grain imports without loans from the state were slim.7 David Arnold has noted that 
the state’s response to a famine is affected not only by economic resources and 
administrative capabilities, but also by the pre-existing conventions and ideology. 
The historical understanding of famines requires alertness to its structural causes 
and its social and cultural parameters.8 Holger Weiss has emphasized that aid is 
dependent on the will and interests of the rulers. Aid is a political act and politics 
defines who receives aid and who does not.9 Since the ecological and economical 
reasons behind the food shortage of 1867 are well explained in earlier research, 
this paper focuses on the role of politics behind the inadequate food imports in 
1867. It also examines the crop forecast data that the decision makers had at hand 
during the summer of 1867. 
In terms of theoretical background, the paper utilizes the famine research of 
late 20th and early 21st century. Development economist Stephen Devereux notes 
that failures of public action should be incorporated into the causal analysis of all 
famines. Although most pre-twentieth century famines were triggered by natural 
catastrophes, the natural triggers operated in contexts where local economies 
were weak and the political will or logistical capacity of the state to intervene was 
lacking. Devereux’s idea that the failure to prevent famines can be explained by 
inadequate information, bureaucratic inertia, lack of capacity to act efficiently as 
well as lack of political will offers an interesting framework for the Finnish case.10 
3 Turpeinen, 1986, 237. See also the contributions of Ludvigsson and Lust in this volume. 
4 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 10, 20; Ikonen, 1991, 86; Pitkänen, 1991, 43.
5 Soininen, 1974, 404.
6 Turpeinen 1986, 153; Turpeinen, 1991, 51; Pitkänen 1991, 63–6; Savolainen, 1989), 35; 
Savolainen, 2006, 782–784; Myllyntaus, 2009, 78.
7 Voutilainen, 2015, 124–44.
8 Arnold, 1988, 8.
9 Weiss, 2000, 121, 169.
10 Devereux, 2000, 13, 27. 
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Economist Amartya Sen has claimed that famines are easy to prevent, if only 
the government tries to prevent them. According to Sen famines do not occur in 
democracies because elections and free media offer strong incentives to undertake 
famine prevention.11 A free press can adduce information from distant areas and 
even bring out information that might be embarrassing to the government. Free 
press and active political opposition constitute the best early-warning system for 
famines.12 Finland in the 1860s was far from a democracy, and the press was subject 
to censorship, but the seeds of political and cultural liberalism were sprouting at 
this time and interesting comparative perspectives with more modern famines can 
be seen in the Finnish case. When keeping in mind the historical context, theories 
and examples from more recent famine research offer fruitful views into the politics 
behind the Finnish food crisis.
Economic and Political Decision 
Making in Finland in the 1860s
During the 1860s Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian 
Empire. The Russian Tsar (ie. the Grand Duke of Finland), had the decisive power, 
but Finland was autonomous in the sense that it had to finance and execute its own 
financial operations. Finnish central government during the period of autonomy 
was dualistic, and incorporated the Senate in Finland as well as Minister Secretary 
of State and a Committee for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg. In addition to the 
Senate and governance in Russia, a separate power was the Governor-General 
who represented the Russian Tsar in Finland. As Häkkinen and Forsberg have 
observed, the Finnish Senate, under the control of the Governor General, “managed 
Finland’s economic and legal matters, and if Finland did not make any financial 
claims on the Russian imperial Treasury, it was not in the Tsar’s interests to limit 
this autonomy”.13 By the 1860s the Senate had taken de facto control of Finland’s 
internal affairs, including foreign trade and economic policy.
In 1809 when Finland, had shifted from Swedish rule and become a Grand 
Duchy within the Russian Empire, Tsar Alexander I of the Russian Empire, had 
convened the four Estates of Finland to the Diet of Porvoo. In principle the Diet had 
power over legislation under the ultimate authority of the Tsar. In practice the Diet 
was not convened between 1809 and 1863, because the Russian government had 
not wanted any meetings of the Estates in the Empire. This further emphasized the 
shift of practical power to the civil servants, working under the Senate’s control. 
11 Sen, 1999, 51–2.
12 Sen, 1999, 181.
13 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 100. 
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The Senate could technically manage the economy and rule the citizens without the 
Diet, but the postponement of new legislation and tax reforms stalled the society.14 
In the 1860s Finland consisted of eight provinces, each with their own provincial 
administration. The Finnish provincial governments were subordinate both to the 
Senate and to the Governor-General. The governors of the provinces had to balance 
the expectations of both the Senate and the Governor-General, which often proved 
challenging.15 The standing of the governors was dualistic also in the sense that 
they were representatives of the central government in the provinces, but also 
representatives of the people to the central government. In the early nineteenth 
century in particular, the governors had an important role in passing information 
from the provinces to the central administration. In the 1860s, due to new channels 
of information, this aspect of the governors’ role diminished in importance. Their 
role in adjusting the expectations of the government in Helsinki with the needs of 
the provinces became stronger.16 
In the event of a crop failure the Senate’s head of financial affairs was ultimately 
responsible for taking care of the consequences.17 The Finnish philosopher, 
journalist and Fennoman Johan Vilhelm Snellman became a senator as well as 
the Senate’s head of financial affairs in July 1863 and maintained his position 
until the spring of 1868.18 In addition to Snellman, the Governor-General Nikolai 
Adlerberg and the provincial governors of the provinces also bore responsibility 
for relief actions in the summer and autumn of 1867.19 Snellman’s importance 
was emphasized by the fact that Adlerberg was on a leave of absence for three 
months in the autumn of 1867 and came back to office in mid-October.20 After his 
return Adlerberg took more responsibility over the famine prevention and Snellman 
stepped aside.21 Snellman’s career as a senator and head of financial affairs of 
the senate ended in the spring of 1868 at the request of Adlerberg.22 Although the 
official reason for Snellman’s resignation were differences of opinion related to the 
building of a railway between Helsinki and St. Petersburg, earlier research has 
14 Tiihonen & Tiihonen, 1983, 270; Kuusterä & Tarkka, 2011, 180; Tiihonen, 2012, 51; Newby & 
Myllyntaus, 2015, 146.
15 Westerlund, 1996, 351. 
16 Westerlund 1996,  371–2.
17 Turpeinen 1986, 148; Savolainen 1989, 21, 61–2; Savolainen, 2005b, 16.
18 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 370–1; Snellman’s public writings [Samlade Arbeten] and his 
correspondence with governors and other officials during the famine years have been edited and 
published as a series of books, which have been used as source material for this article [hereafter 
Snellman SA].
19 Häkkinen, 1991a, 130–1.
20 Oulun Wiikko-Sanomia, 27 Jul. 1867; Hufvudstadsbladet, 21 Oct.1867. Adlerberg’s leave was 
health related. See Tapio, 27 Jul. 1867. 
21 Turpeinen, 1991, 55.
22 Savolainen, 1989, 63.
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suggested that disagreements in relation to handling the food crises were the real 
reason behind his departure.23 
The breakthrough of economic and political liberalism in Finland during the 
1850s and 1860s also set the context for political decision-making at the time. 
Trade freedom, convening of the Diet and freedom of press were advocated. The 
two main political movements of the time – the Fennomans and the Liberals – 
were on opposite sides in the debates around language politics and relations with 
Russia and Sweden, but in matters concerning political and economic freedom they 
both advocated a reform. New newspapers were established and they became an 
arena for economic policy discussions. These events in Finland were connected 
to general European developments, marked by the emergence of economic and 
political liberalism.24 Democratization of the society has usually been seen as 
a factor that prevents famines, yet the Finnish crisis arose at a time when such 
changes were just beginning.25
Snellman’s Economic and Aid Policy
Snellman’s standing as the head of financial affairs of the Senate gave him an 
opportunity to realise aid politics that he had been proposing in his writings since 
the 1840s.26 His primary objective as the head of financial affairs was to balance the 
economy of Finland.27 Again to quote Häkkinen and Forsberg: “Snellman believed 
that economic independence was [essential for] political state independence, and 
accordingly his policies during the famine can be seen as prioritizing the longer-
term development of the nation before individuals or regions”.28 For years Snellman 
had been criticizing the old model of aid politics, where the crown would take a loan 
and then lend money to merchants for grain imports, which they would then sell 
to the common people with credit. For example in 1862 a loan that was originally 
meant for a monetary reform in Finland was used for this purpose. There was 
even need for an additional loan from Bank of Finland and from bankers in St. 
Petersburg to finance grain imports in 1862.29 
Snellman claimed that the involvement of the state in the grain trade had caused 
the traders to import large amounts of grain that was then passed out to the people 
with no worries of payback. Snellman had decided to abandon this structure, the 
23 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 371; Kuusterä & Tarkka, 2011, 238; Tiihonen, 2012, 53–4.
24 Heikkinen & Kuusterä, 2007, 30; Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 349. 
25 See, e.g.: Sen 1999; Ó Gráda, 1999.
26 Savolainen, 1989, 21. 
27 Kuusterä, 1989, 97.
28 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 107. See also Heikkinen, Heinonen, Kuusterä & Pekkarinen, 2000, 81. 
29 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 439–41.
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state could take no more loans and the damaging system had to end.30 Until the 
end of the summer 1867 the Senate refrained from taking foreign debt and from 
lending money to merchants for grain imports.31 When efforts for a state loan to 
finance grain imports began in September, a failure of crops had already been 
experienced not only in Finland but also  large areas of the Russian Empire as well 
as Sweden. The import of grain was made difficult by high prices as well as lack 
of supply.32 
Central to Snellman’s policy was also the idea of refraining from gratuitous aid. 
Self-sufficiency and frugality were encouraged, as outlined by Snellman in two 
unpublished writings in 1866. In these writings, Snellman criticized the way in which 
people in large swathes of the country still believed that the crown would help them 
when in need. This mindset, Snellman believed, was destructive and had made 
the common people unable to help themselves through hard work and saving. 
Snellman even criticized meetings that were held in the municipalities to find out 
how much help was needed. The common people needed to understand that the 
crown had no more money and that they therefore needed to work harder, save 
more and take better care of their personal economy – and keep in mind that God 
would help by blessing honest endeavours to help oneself and others. Aid that was 
given too early made the people slow to help themselves. Snellman also accused 
the common people of having lavish spending habits, specifically that they bought 
large amounts of foreign fabrics, coffee, cigarettes and sugar and also drank most 
of the spirits.33 Referring to the inability of the people to save, Snellman wrote: “It 
is harsh to say this, but those many bad years are largely the people’s own fault”.34 
Snellman was certainly not alone in holding these opinions. The conception 
that the personal features of the poor people were to blame for their poverty 
was rather prominent in Finnish public discussion in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Helping a person would just sustain the bad features that had created poverty.35 
The idea that generous help would destroy the morality of the people and postpone 
the destruction into the future was also common in Great Britain during the Irish 
Famine of the 1840s.36 Assistant Secretary to the Treasury of the United Kingdom 
Charles Edward Trevelyan did not see problems with the economic policy he led, 
but pointed to Irish customs as part of the explanation for the famine.37 
Since gratuitous aid was not an option, relief needed to be obtained through 
work. According to Snellman the experience of all countries had shown that 
30 Savolainen, 2005a, 22.
31 Häkkinen, 1992, 153; Häkkinen, 1999, 114–5.
32 Pihkala, 1970, 147–8; Turpeinen, 1986, 237; Hirvonen, 2013, 62–3.
33 SA XI.2, 1194–8, 1201–5.
34 SA XI.2, 1197. Author’s own translation.
35 Pulma, 1994, 58.
36 Ó Gráda 1999, 6.
37 Sen 1999, 174–5. 
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aid without compensation was a wasted effort.38 The employment policy would 
support the economy of Finland, build the people’s morality and prevent begging.39 
This emphasis on hard work was visible in Snellman’s enthusiasm for supporting 
small-scale home industries, such as weaving simple fabrics. In his letter to the 
governors in July 1867 Snellman noted that since agriculture did not offer work for 
the people for the entire year, forms of home industries would provide employment 
and income for the people during the winter. Snellman was hoping that the Finnish 
merchants would take responsibility over the export of these products, in addition 
to the material and production costs, so that the producers would get monetary 
reward towards the finished products.40 If sincere, Snellman’s expectations were 
certainly unrealistic, and too much responsibility was given to merchants who 
were generally, understandably, unwilling to take big financial risks in the prevailing 
situation. Although it became clear during the summer and autumn of 1867 that 
there would be no market for these products, this activity was continued until the 
end of 1867.41 
Another form of aid that gained a lot of publicity was spreading information on 
emergency or surrogate foods. Emergency food – such as bark bread– was not 
unknown to the Finnish people even before the crisis of the 1860s. In northern 
Finland in particular, people had to resort to bark bread quite regularly.42 In July 
1867, Snellman advised the governors to spread information on emergency food 
such as mushroom and moss.43 The governors seem to have reacted to this form 
of aid rather positively and provided Snellman with information on developments 
with the emergency food education in their provinces during summer 1867.44 Even 
the press seems to have taken a positive attitude towards this form of aid. The 
press published information on emergency food actively and presented it as an 
alternative for grain: “Nobody will need to die of hunger under the threat of failure 
of crops this year – as far as we know – as long as we make a quarrel against 
our entrenched idleness and inefficiency and begin to collect all the food that the 
nature abundantly offers.”45 
Snellman’s writings during the famine years have been seen as an attempt to 
prevent passivity in the Finnish population. Rumours of a loan for grain imports 
could have made the people passive, so the rules had to be set straight. In this 
38 SA VIII, 75.
39 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 44; SA VIII, 67–76; SA XI.2,1201.
40 SA XI.2, 1260–2; SA XI.1, 310–2.
41 Häkkinen, Ikonen, Pitkänen & Soikkanen, 1989, 44.
42 Häkkinen, 1991b, 99; Ikonen, 1991, 82.
43 National Archives of Finland [KA], Ministry of Finance Archive [VVA], DA117: Communication to 
the Governors of Vaasa, Oulu, Hämeenlinna, Mikkeli, and the acting governor of Kuopio, relating to 
the use of mushrooms and other substitute foodstuffs. 31 Jul. 1867. 
44 SA XI.2, 1263–7, 1287–9; 1295–7.
45 Oulun Wiikko-Sanomia, 17 Aug. 1867. Author’s own translation.
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sense the publicity has been seen as advancing common goals in fighting famine.46 
This kind of interpretation seems to be based on the ruler’s conception that the 
people and their laziness were at the core of the problem. Snellman’s writings 
could also be seen as use of power and an attempt to calm the people in the face 
of a threatening crisis. Especially when considering that efforts for a foreign loan 
only began in September 1867, and not much was done during the summer.
It is interesting to note that although similarities can be found in Snellman’s 
writings and the ideas behind the British politics during the Irish famine, the 
historiography of these two famines is very different. Finnish historians have until 
very recently been rather understanding towards the decision makers of the time 
whereas British officials have been condemned more harshly in the historiography 
of the Irish famine. The status of Finland as a part of Russia creates an interesting 
question in this aspect. In the earlier half on the 19th century Finns had received aid 
from the Tsar, at least when it was in the empire’s strategic interests.47 In the 1860s 
Finland already had its own economic policy and Finnish officials were responsible 
for the aid policy. Bureaucratic inertia between the different echelons of power as 
well as the willingness to please superiors and foster the economic power and 
independence of Finland could explain some of the actions. The Russian officials 
were generally pleased if Finland did not cause economic strain.48 
Because the Finnish decision makers were responsible for the aid politics it 
is quite understandable that the crisis has a very different meaning in the Finnish 
historical narrative than the Irish history writing of the 1840s.49 It is interesting 
to ponder in what measure the apolitical historiography of the Finnish famine is 
actually a consequense of delibarate national identity construction of the Fennoman 
politicians and historians of the late nineteenth century. Henrik Forsberg has rather 
aptly pointed how the process to naturalize the famine began in Finnish public 
discussion soon after the crisis. Both the Finnish and Swedish speaking elites of 
Finland shared the idea that the famine had been an unfortunate outcome of poor 
weather. The naturalization and depolitication of the 1860s Finnish Famine (i.e. 
emphasising the frost as a main reason) suited the Finnish elite very well. Frost 
was politcally neutral and did not challenge the political elite or the power relations 
in the society. It was also equally feared by all members of rural communities 
and thus bridged rural class differences. Concentrating on the frost also suited 
nationalist ideas by creating a link between contemporary events and the nation’s 
mythical forefathers’ struggles in the hard climate. In the national historiographies 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the question of culpability was 
often left unaddressed. If anyone was to be blamed, it was those who had become 
too accustomed to a comfortable lifestyle and who had not learned to adjust their 
46 Turpeinen, 1986, 161; Savolainen, 1989, 34. 
47 Turpeinen, 1991, 30, 57.
48 Kuusterä,1992, 71.
49 Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 148–9.
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spending accordingly. As unfortunate as the famine was, it was also a reminder 
that one should not rely on handouts from the Tsar.50 
Information on Crop Forecasts
In the 1860s Finnish people got most of their nutrition from grain. The two most 
important grains in Finland were barley and rye.51 According to estimates made in 
the 1860s the annual requirement of grain per person was about two barrels.52 The 
population of Finland in the 1860s was about 1.8 million, so according to this rather 
rough estimation about 3.6 million barrels of grain would have been sufficient to 
feed the population of Finland.
Figures 1. and 2. show the rye and barley crops in barrels in Finland’s eight 
provinces in a three year period from 1865 to 1867.  The combined yearly crop of 
rye and barley in Finland was roughly 2.5 million barrels in 1865, 3 million barrels in 
1866 and only 1.7 million barrels in 1867.53 It is noticeable that the rye crop of 1867 
was considerably smaller than the previous year in most provinces. According to 
the rough estimate presented above, the crop of 1867 would have been enough to 
feed only half of Finland’s population. The situation was worsened by the fact that 
the crops of previous years were insufficient as well.54
50 Forsberg, 2017.
51 Ikonen, 1991, 81
52 SVT II:1, 4; SVT II:2, 8. N.B. 1 barrel = 1,6489 hectolitres (SVT II:1, 24).
53 SVT II:1, Litt. B. & SVT II:2, Litt B.
54 Voutilainen, 2015, 124–44.
Figure 1. Rye crop in Finland 1865–1867, 1 000 of barrels
SVT II:1, Litt. B.; SVT II:2, Litt B.
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Since grain had such an important place in the nutrition of Finns, the information 
on crop expectations during the summer months was crucial. Because of Finland’s 
poor infrastructure, imports for the winter needed to be agreed early so that they 
could be carried out before the ports iced over at the end of the year. Earlier research 
has noted that the information on crop forecasts during the summer and autumn of 
1867 was insufficient.55 It has been said that the Senate did not waver in its efforts 
to begin grain imports, once it was clear that night frosts in early September had 
ruined the crop in large parts of the country.56 This claim can be questioned by the 
fact that early September is a perfectly normal time for night frosts to occur in large 
parts of Finland. The cold spring and summer of 1867 meant that sowing was done 
later than usual which meant later harvest – and higher risk of night frost during the 
period of growth.57 
During the 1860s the governors were still a very important source of information 
for the Senate. Governors provided Snellman with information on crop expectations 
through their private letters as well as official reports and telegrams. In the 1860s 
governors sent three official reports on crop expectations to the Senate’s finance 
department during the growth season.58 The second report, sent in August, was 
particularly important, since it gave a somewhat reliable forecast of the yearly crop 
expectations, yet left some time for organizing grain imports before the winter, 
if needed. I have collected the data on barley and rye crop expectations from 
the second reports of the governors from all of Finland’s eight provinces from a 
55 Turpeinen, 1986, 150, 153; Turpeinen 1991, 51; Pitkänen, 1991, 63–4; Savolainen, 2006, 782–4.
56 Pitkänen, 1991, 63–4. 
57 Hirvonen, 2013, 70; Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 106–7; Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 151.
58 Johanson, 1924, 58.
Figure 2. Barley crop in Finland 1865–1867, 1 000 of barrels
SVT II:1, Litt. B.; SVT II:2, Litt B.
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three-year period 1865–1867. From this data I have calculated the median for 
crop expectations for each province (Figures 3. and 4.). The information from the 
province of Viipuri is unfortunately missing from 1865 and 1866.59
In August 1867 the governors’ reports estimated either an average or below 
average rye crop. Although some individual districts were expecting a failure of 
crops, the median of each province is either below average or average. Compared 
to the previous year, 1866, the expectations were slightly lower in all other provinces 
except Turku-Pori. The estimates were reasonably accurate, although the actual 
crop of 1867 was below 1866 in all of the provinces. In comparison with 1865, most 
provinces were expecting a similar or a smaller crop. Two provinces, Kuopio and 
Mikkeli, were expecting a slightly better rye crop in 1867 than in 1865. In Mikkeli 
the crop of 1867, although quite poor, was actually slightly better than in 1865, but 
in Kuopio the rye crop of 1867 was below 1865. As a summary of the rye crop 
expectations in 1867 it can be said that although the expectations were slightly too 
positive in some provinces, they did not give hope for a good crop.60 
59 For more detailed information see Hirvonen, 2013, attachment 4.
60 See figures 1 & 3. 
Figure 3. Rye crop expectations, second reports of the governors, 1865– 1867 median, 
(1=failure of crops, 2=under average, 3=average crop, 4=above average, 5=good crop) 
Hirvonen 2013, attachment 4.
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In a quick glance the governors’ official reports on barley crop expectations 
would seem to give reason to expect an average crop corresponding to previous 
years.61 When looking into the actual crop harvested, it is clear that the crop of 1867 
was much below previous years. The barley crop was especially poor in the three 
northernmost provinces – Oulu, Vaasa and Kuopio – where it also had significant 
importance as a crop.62 When evaluating the information of the governors’ reports, 
it is important to note that several governors reminded Snellman in their reports 
of the threat that a possible frost caused to the barley crop. If frost would not 
ruin the crop, only then was an average yield expected.63 The threat of frost was 
also mentioned in the governors’ private letters to Snellman, as well as in the 
newspapers, and can very well be seen as general knowledge at the time.64 
Unfortunately the governors’ fears were realised as a night frost in early 
September 1867 ruined the barley crop in large parts of Finland. Night frosts at 
this time of year were rather typical in many parts of Finland, but because of the 
unusually cold spring of 1867 the crop did not have enough time to mature during 
the summer of 1867 making it more vulnerable to a night frost in September. It has 
also been noted that unlike in Ireland where the phytophthora infestans had been 
previously unknown – the main reason for the crop failure in Finland, the frost, was 
61 See figure 4.
62 See figures 2. and 4.
63 Suomalainen Wirallinen Lehti, 30 Jul, 2 Aug. 1867. KA, VVA: Valtiovaraintoimituskunnan kirjediaari 
KD51/183 (1867); Senaatin talousosaston kirjediaari KD45/158 (1867); Valtiovaraintoimituskunnan 
kirjediaari KD32/134 (1867).
64 SA XI.2, 1248; Meurman, 1892, 32–3; Helsingfors Dagblad, 24 Aug. 1867.
Figure 4. Barley crop expectations, second reports of the governors, 1865– 1867 median 
(1=failure of crops, 2=under average, 3=average crop, 4= above average, 5=good crop
Hirvonen 2013, attachment 4.
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a common phenomenon.65 Although Snellman may have acted rapidly once he 
heard about the damage caused by the frost, it is impossible to claim that the frost 
– and the crop failure that followed – should have been a surprise to anyone.
The importance of official reports is somewhat diminished by the fact that 
Snellman as well as others had questioned the reliability of these reports.66 The 
route of official reports from the local officers in the different districts of each 
province to the governors and finally to the senate could take weeks. Thus it is clear 
that the official reports did not always contain the most up-to-date information. In 
the 1860s the telegram network that had been developed since the 1850s offered 
possibilities for quicker exchange of information between the senate and provincial 
offices as well as grain merchants.67 In early August 1862, during a previous crop 
failure, Senator Axel Ludvig Born used the telegram system to inquire about the 
grain expectations from the governors. In mid August, after receiving information 
from the provinces, Born started organizing grain imports by asking the governors 
to contact local merchants. A few days later some merchants were informed that 
the Senate had decided to offer them a loan for nine months without interest.68 
Even J.V. Snellman commented on the government’s efficient use of this new 
technology in an article published in 1862: “One must acknowledge that the quick 
actions of the government have been possible because of the telegram.”69 In 1867 
similar telegrams between Snellman and the governors can be found only after 
the night frosts of early September. The possibilities for receiving more up-to-date 
information through the telegram were available also in 1867, but it seems that this 
technology was not used to its fullest. 
Snellman also claimed that the governors’ reports were unreliable, since the 
local officers had a tendency to underestimate the crop expectations.70 In his letter 
to Snellman, the governor of Turku-Pori, C.M. Creuz, tried to defend the estimations 
of local officers of his province to Snellman. It was not easy to forecast likely crop 
yields and the governor was assured that most of the local officers were doing 
their best to fulfil their reporting duties.71 From the governors’ letters it is obvious 
that Snellman did not spare criticism if he felt that the governors were too lenient 
with the aid policy. Governors had to explain to Snellman that they had not in any 
way encouraged requests for aid.72 In August 1867, Creutz described his worries 
to Snellman: 
65 Häkkinen & Forsberg, 2015, 106–7; Newby & Myllyntaus, 2015, 151.
66 Kuujo, 1948, 19–20; SA XI.1, 9; Uusi Suometar, 17 Aug. 1877.
67 Peltonen, 1983), 19.
68 KA, VVA: Hl 1 (List of the measures undertaken by the Royal Senate from the start of July 1862).
69 SA XI.1, 7. Author’s own translation.
70 SA XI.2, 1203, 1268.
71 SA XI.2, 1268–9.
72 SA XI.2, 952–3, 1267–8, 1304–5.
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-- I have never been one of them, who accepts the patronage under which the government 
has kept the Finnish people for decades and which has created the reluctance and 
inability in the people to take care of their own affairs. Instead I have criticized it, and 
nobody could be happier than me that the system has been changed. Still, it should 
be noted that all sudden changes from a system to its opposite are dangerous and this 
change is taking place at a time when there has been many difficult years in a row, and 
I can only hope, that the change would be gradual and that the support from the state 
would not stop completely at once.73
There were also some personal differences between the governors in their 
communications with Snellman, which gives reason to question their ability to 
present the best interest of the people of the provinces. In the autumn of 1867 the 
governors of the provinces of Kuopio and of Turku and Pori seemed genuinely 
worried in their letters to Snellman whereas Theodor Sebastian Thilén, the governor 
of the province of Mikkeli demonstrated an exceptional lack of empathy towards the 
people in his letter to Snellman: “I hope that the harsh starvation will teach many 
things. And if it will not, it does not matter if a few dozen slackers die of hunger.”74 
In addition to the governors, the local press provided information on the crop 
expectations and threatening food crisis. In the 1860s the press was still rather 
constricted. Although the distribution of newspapers was growing, the group 
of people that read newspapers was still socially very restricted.75 During the 
autonomy the Finnish press was also restricted by Russian censorship laws.76 The 
Diet of 1865 implemented the act on freedom of the press in Finland, but since 
the Russian officials believed that the freedom of the press in Finland could not 
differ from the rest of the Empire, censorship was introduced again in May 1867.77 
Despite these restrictions the newspapers had already for several years reported 
on the unfortunate situation of Finland. In the summer of 1867 several newspapers 
referred directly to the threat of famine.78 Although the press did report on the poor 
food supply in the country, it did not directly hold the government responsible or 
express requests for aid from the government.79 
Snellman was very critical towards the reports of the press on the famine. He 
constantly criticized the press for its complaints and inadequate information.80 In 
his published writings from 1866 and 1867 Snellman even tried to calm the people 
rather than allowing the press to stoke fears of famine. Snellman praised the local 
73 SA XI.2, 1268. Author’s own translation.
74 SA XI.2, 1301. Author’s own translation.
75 Häkkinen, 1991b, 105.
76 Tommila, 1982, 7; Nieminen, 2006, 100.
77 Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2009, 356.
78 Helsingfors Dagblad, 15 Jun., 17 Aug., 27 Aug. 1867; Ilmarinen, 2 Aug. 1867; Oulun Wiikko-
Sanomia, 10 Aug. 1867.
79 Hirvonen, 2013, 105–10.
80 SA XI.1, 316–8, 892–3; SA XI.2, 932.
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papers of northern Finland for the fact that they had not exaggerated the situation 
and for this reason the correspondents of Oulu and Kuopio provinces had offered 
their stories for the newspapers of Southern Finland.81
Although Snellman was worried that the local officers and press had a tendency 
to underestimate the crop expectations and exaggerate the misery following crop 
failure, research of other famines has shown examples of the opposite. Amartya 
Sen has described the Great Leap Famine of the mid-twentieth century in China 
as a situation where the lack of free press led the government to become a victim 
of its own propaganda. The local civil servants gave overly positive reports of 
the local situation in hopes of gaining popularity in Beijing.82 There is not enough 
proof to make a corresponding claim of the Finnish case, but when examining the 
communication between Snellman and the governors as well as Snellman’s attitude 
towards the reports of the press, it does not seem impossible that such problems 
could have occurred at some level in Finland. When looking into the technical 
developments in communications in the 1860s the claim that there was not enough 
information does not seem tenable. Based on Snellman’s writings it seems rather 
clear that Snellman was not interested in receiving more information on the needs 
of the provinces. The administration did not use all channels of information to their 
fullest extent. 
Conclusions 
According to Stephen Devereux the failure to prevent famines is explained by 
insufficient information, bureaucratic inertia, lack of capacity to act efficiently as 
well as lack of political will.83 In the case of Finland in the autumn of 1867 all of 
these explanatory factors can be found. The food crisis is explained by a lack of 
resources, a lack of political will to help the hungry as well as inadequate use of 
information. 
Previous research has emphasized the importance of poor financial resources 
as a significant factor in explaining the hunger crisis of 1867–1868. It is indisputable 
that financial resources to prevent the food crisis were poor. However, the famine 
research of the new millennium has proved that economic distress does not always 
lead to a famine. Concentrating merely on economic factors offers a simplified 
explanation and creates a depolarised picture of the famine.
Refraining from gratuitous aid was the guideline of J.V. Snellman’s relief policies 
during the summer of 1867. The people were encouraged to help themselves and 
be frugal. In the summer of 1867 the relief actions concentrated on collection of 
emergency food and the development of handicraft activities. Since the problems 
81 SA XI.1, 316–8; SA, XI.2, 1201–5.
82 Sen, 1999, 180–1. 
83 Devereux, 2000, 27.
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behind these forms of aid were well visible already in the summer, the activities can 
be seen as a means to calm the people in a threatening situation, more than true 
attempts to help. In the internal correspondence of Snellman and the governors the 
fear of  an impending catastrophe is much more visible than in Snellman’s published 
writings.
However, Snellman was not alone with his ideas of the destructive consequences 
of generous and gratuitous aid. The idea, that the poor were themselves 
responsible for their inferior standing was common in the mid-nineteenth-century 
public discussion in Finland. In the 1860s the society also accepted inequality and 
the state was not actively held responsible.84 Although Snellman was accountable 
for the chosen politics, his strict politics did receive support. Social historian 
Christopher Lloyd has emphasized that the actions of a person are caused not 
only individually, but also socially. Attempts to explain actions should also include 
analysis of the society and its structures.85 The failure to help the hungry was 
based not solely on the individual decisions that were made, but also on wider 
structural factors. The unequal society and undemocratic governance of the 1860s 
allowed a situation where the rulers could execute politics that did not serve the 
best interest of the masses.
A key factor in the context of this crisis was the lack of a political counter force 
to the government. The press reported diligently on the threatening food crisis, but 
did not actively hold the government responsible. Censorship laws that came in to 
effect in the end of May 1867 restricted the freedom of the press. It is still rather 
probable that the press was mainly restricted by social and economic factors. The 
proportion of the population of Finland reading the newspapers was very small in 
the 1860’s. The press did not represent the poor.
The poor did not have a means for resistance in the 1860s, but it does not 
mean that the political features of this crisis could not be evaluated. The apolitical 
historical picture of the crisis represents the view that the decision makers of the 
time had. The actions of the central decision makers were based on strong political 
views. Even political consequences can be seen, since Snellman did have to resign 
from his position in the spring of 1868. It is notable that only rather recently have 
Snellman’s actions related to the famine been brought up as an explanatory factor 
behind the resignation in mainstream historiography. The historiography of the 
1860s has until very recently had very little room for questioning the solidarity of 
the elite towards their less fortunate countrymen and women. It seems that the lack 
of counterforce to the government’s politics was not only visible in the politics and 
press of the time, but also in the Finnish public discussion decades after the event. 
The information that the decision makers had at hand was also rather 
inadequate. The reports sent by the governors did not give hope for a good crop, 
but the somewhat positive reports in August may have misled the Senate. It is also 
84 Soikkanen, 1991, 28.
85 Lloyd, 1986, 162–3.
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possible that the willingnes to please the superiors could have led the governors 
to some modesty in their requests. It is clear that Snellman did not appreciate 
repetitive requests of aid from the provinces. Snellman would also have had 
possibilities to supplement the information from the reports of the newspapers. 
Also the telegram offered possibilities for a more timely exchange of information, 
but this means was not used efficiently. It seems that it was just as much a case 
of inadequate information as well as inadequate use of the information that was 
available. Most famines take a long time to develop86 and this also seems to have 
been the case in Finland in the 1860s. The Finnish case represents a phenomenon 
which persists even today. Although the information of an impending food crisis is 
in the air for months or even years, this does not guarantee a reaction.87 
References
Helsinki: National Archives of Finland. 









Suomenmaan virallinen tilasto II. Yhteenveto kuvernöörien viisivuotis-kertomuksista vuosilta 
1861–1865. (Helsinki: Keisarillisen Senaatin kirjapaino, 1868) [SVT II:1]
Suomenmaan virallinen tilasto II. Toinen jakso. Katsaus Suomen taloudelliseen tilaan vuosina 
1866–1870. (Helsinki Keisarillisen Senaatin kirjapaino, 1875) [SVT II:2]
Arnold, D. 1988. Famine. Social Crisis and Historical Change. Oxford & New York: Blackwell.
Devereux, S. 2000. Famine in the Twentieth Century. IDS Working Paper 105. (Institute of 
Development studies, University of Sussex). Accessed 29 Oct. 2016 via: www.ids.ac.uk/
files/dmfile/wp105.pdf 
Forsberg, H. 2017. Masculine submission: National Narratives of the Last Great Famine, 1868–
1920. Journal of Finnish Studies 20:1. Forthcoming.
Heikkinen, S., V. Heinonen, A. Kuusterä & J. Pekkarinen. 2000. The History of Finnish Economic 
Thought 1809–1917. Ekenäs. Societas Scientiarum Fennica. 
86 Devereux, 2000, 27 
87 Weiss, 2000, 122. 
“The Enormous Failure of Nature”: Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century
100
Heikkinen, S. & S. Tiihonen. 2009. Valtionrakentaja. Valtiovarainministeriön historia 1. Helsinki: 
Edita.
Heikkinen, S. & A. Kuusterä. 2007. Virkakoneiston rattaat ja talouden pyörät. Suomalaisen 
talouspolitiikan alku (1809–1860). In V. Heinonen, M. Jäntti & J. Vartiainen (eds.) 
Kansantaloustiede, talouspolitiikka ja hyvinvointivaltio – juhlakirja Jukka Pekkarisen 
kunniaksi. Helsinki: Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos. 26–67.
Hirvonen, H. 2013. Tiedon, tahdon vai resurssien puutetta? – Suomen hallinto ja syksyn 1867 
elintarvikekriisi. University of Helsinki. Unpublished Masters Dissertation. Accessible via 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/38855
Häkkinen, A., V. Ikonen, K. Pitkänen & H. Soikkanen. 1989. 1860-luvun suuret nälkävuodet. 
Tutkimus eri väestöryhmien mielialoista ja toimintamalleista. Loppuraportti. Helsinki: 
Helsingin yliopiston talous- ja sosiaalihistorian tiedonantoja N:o 21. Helsinki 1989.
Häkkinen, A. 1991a. Kovat ajat ja sosiaaliset suhteet ‘Pernaan lapuan tie tehtiin jauhonaaloolla 
näläkävuosina’ – Hätäaputyöt: epäonnistuiko valtiovalta? In A. Häkkinen, V. Ikonen, K. 
Pitkänen & H. Soikkanen (eds.) Kun halla nälän tuskan toi. Miten Suomalaiset kokivat 
1860-luvun nälkävuodet. Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY. 129–57.
Häkkinen, A. 1991b. ‘Kuolema tulee jäkäläleiwästä!’ Hätäravinto, jäkä- läleipävalistus ja sen 
vastaanotto. In A. Häkkinen, V. Ikonen, K. Pitkänen & H. Soikkanen (eds.) Kun halla 
nälän tuskan toi. Miten Suomalaiset kokivat 1860-luvun nälkävuodet. Porvoo, Helsinki, 
Juva: WSOY. 91–113.
Häkkinen, A. 1992. On Attitudes and Living Strategies in the Finnish Countryside in the Years 
of Famine 1867–1868. In A. Häkkinen (ed.), Just a Sack of Potatoes? Crisis Experience 
in European Societies, Past and Present. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 149–
66.
Häkkinen, A. 1999. Nälkä, valta ja kylä 1967–68. In P. Haapala (ed.) Talous, valta ja valtio. 
Tutkimuksia 1800-luvun Suomesta. Tampere: Vastapaino. 111–130. Häkkinen, A. & H. 
Forsberg (2015). Finland’s famine years of the 1860s: a nineteenth century perspective. 
In D. Curran, L. Luciuk & A.G. Newby (eds.) Famines in European Economic History: 
The Last Great European Famines Reconsidered. Abingdon: Routledge. 99–123.
Ikonen, V. 1991. Kyse oli ennen kaikkea leivästä ‘On syöty kaikkea, joka vain on ollut kiveä 
pehmeämpää’ – Ravintokysymys 1860-luvulla. In A. Häkkinen, V. Ikonen, K. Pitkänen & 
H. Soikkanen (eds.) Kun halla nälän tuskan toi. Miten Suomalaiset kokivat 1860-luvun 
nälkävuodet. Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY. 81–90.
Johanson, V.F. 1924. Finlands agrarpolitiska historia 1. En skildring av det finländska lantbrukets 
ekonomiska betingelser. Från 1600-talet till år 1870. Helsingfors: Söderström.
Kuujo, E. 1948. Suomen kuvernöörien kertomukset läänien tilasta Venäjän vallan aikana. 
Helsinki: Valtionarkisto.
Kuusterä, A. 1989. Valtion sijoitustoiminta pääomamarkkinoiden murroksessa 1859–1913.
Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura.
Kuusterä, A. 1992. Valtio, talous ja valtiontalous. In P. Haapala (ed.) Talous, valta ja valtio. 
Tutkimuksia 1800-luvun Suomesta. Tampere: Vastapaino. 55–80.Kuusterä, A. & J. 
Tarkka. 2011. Bank of Finland 200 years. Imperial Cashier to Central Bank. Helsinki: 
Otava.
Lloyd, C. 1986. Explanation in Social History. Oxford: Blackwell.
Meurman, A. 1892. Nälkävuodet 1860-luvulla. Helsinki: Kansanvalistus-Seura.
Myllyntaus, T. 2009. Summer Frost: A Natural Hazard with Fatal Consequences in Pre-
Industrial Finland. In C. Mauch & C. Pfister (eds.) Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: 




Newby A.G. & T. Myllyntaus. 2015. ‘The Terrible Visitation’: Famine in Finland and Ireland 
1845-68 – Towards an Agenda for Comparative Irish-Finnish Famine Studies. In D. 
Curran, L. Luciuk & A.G. Newby (eds.) Famines in European Economic History: The Last 
Great European Famines Reconsidered. Abingdon: Routledge. 145–65. 
Nieminen, H. 2006. Kansa seisoi loitompana. Kansallisen julkisuuden rakentuminen Suomessa 
1809–1917. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Ó Gráda, C. 1999. Black ‘47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and 
Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Peltonen, M. 1983. Liikenne Suomessa 1860–1913. Helsinki: Suomen Pankki.
Pihkala, E. 1970. Suomen Venäjän-kauppa vuosina 1860–1917. Helsinki: Suomen Tiedeseura.
Pitkänen, K. 1991. Kärsimysten ja ahdingon vuosikymmen – 1860-luvun yleiskuva. In A. 
Häkkinen, V. Ikonen, K. Pitkänen & H. Soikkanen (eds.) Kun halla nälän tuskan toi. Miten 
Suomalaiset kokivat 1860-luvun nälkävuodet. Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY. 36–77.
Pulma, P. 1994. Vaivaisten valtakunta. In J. Jaakkola, P. Pulma, M. Satka & K. Urponen (eds.) 
Armeliaisuus, Yhteisöapu, Sosiaaliturva. Suomalaisen Sosiaalisen Turvan Historia. 
Helsinki: Sosiaaliturvan Keskusliitto. 15–70.
Savolainen, R. 1989. J.V. Snellman ja nälkävuodet 1867–1868. Kuopio: Kuopion 
kaupunginhallitus.
Savolainen, R. 2005a. J.V Snellman – rahauudistuksen toimeenpanija. In R. Savolainen, 
S. Linnavalli & J. Selovuori (eds.) J.V. Snellmanin kootut teokset 21. Helsinki: 
Opetusministeriö.
Savolainen, R. 2005b. J.V Snellman – suurten nälkävuosien kriisijohtaja. In R. Savolainen, 
S. Linnavalli & J. Selovuori (eds.) J.V. Snellmanin kootut teokset 22. Helsinki: 
Opetusministeriö.
Savolainen, R. 2006. Sivistyksen voimalla. J.V. Snellmanin elämä. Helsinki: Edita.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Snellman, J.V. 1996. Samlade Arbeten VIII. Helsingfors. Statsrådets kansli.
Snellman, J.V. 1998. Samlade Arbeten XI.1. Helsingfors. Statsrådets kansli.
Snellman, J.V. 1998. Samlade Arbeten XI.2. Helsingfors. Statsrådets kansli.
Soininen, A.M. 1974. Vanha maataloutemme. Maatalous ja maatalousväestö Suomessa 
perinnäisen maatalouden loppukaudella 1720-luvulta 1870-luvulle. Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura. 
Soikkanen H. 1991. Miekalla nälällä ja rutolla – kriisit historiassa. In A. Häkkinen, V. Ikonen, K. 
Pitkänen & H. Soikkanen (eds.) Kun halla nälän tuskan toi. Miten Suomalaiset kokivat 
1860-luvun nälkävuodet. Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY. 11–35.
Tiihonen, S. 2012. The Ministry of Finance. Two hundred years of state-building, nation-building 
& crisis management in Finland. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
Tiihonen, S. & P. Tiihonen. 1983. Suomen hallintohistoria. Helsinki: Valtion koulutuskeskus.
Tommila, P. 1982. Taustasidonnaisuus ja maailmankuva – lehdistöhistorian tutkimusongelmia. 
Helsinki: SSLH.
Turpeinen, O. 1986. Nälkä vai tauti tappoi? Kauhunvuodet 1866–1868. Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura.
Turpeinen, O. 1991. Näläntorjunta ja hyvinvointivaltion perusteet. Hallinto ja kansalainen 
Suomessa 1808–1905. Helsinki: Vapk-kustannus,
Voutilainen, M. 2015. Feeding the famine. Social vulnerability and dislocation during the Great 
Finnish Famine of the 1860s. In D. Curran, L. Luciuk & A.G. Newby (eds.) Famines 
in European Economic History. The Last Great European Famines Reconsidered. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 124–44.
“The Enormous Failure of Nature”: Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century
102
Weiss, H. 2000. Nälkä. In R. Marjomaa, J. Nurmiainen & H. Weiss Ilmestyskirjan ratsastajat. 
Sota, nälkä, taudit ja kuolema historiassa. Tampere: Vastapaino. 111–190.
Westerlund, L. 1996. Lääninhallinto 1808–1917. In J. Numminen & R. Savolainen (eds.) 
Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809–1906. Hallintohistoriakomitea. Helsinki: Edita & 
Valtioneuvoston kanslia. 347–377.
